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In this paper we follow on the seminal work of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991)
and reinvestigate the returns to seniority in the U.S. These papers specify a wage function, in which
workers’ wages can change through two channels: (a) returns to their seniority; and (b) returns
to their labor market experience. We start from the same wage equation as in previous studies,
and, following our theoretical model, we explicitly include a participation-employment equation
a n da ni n t e r ﬁrm mobility equation. The employment and mobility decisions deﬁne the individual’s
experience and seniority. Because experience and seniority are fully endogenized, we introduce
into the wage equation a summary of the workers’ entire career and past jobs. The three-equation
system is estimated simultaneously using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). For all
three education groups that we study, returns to seniority are quite high, even higher than what
was previously obtained by Topel. On the other hand, the returns to experience appear to be
similar to those previously found in the literature.
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There has been an ongoing debate in the literature about the returns to human capital, particularly
in the United States. Part of the debate is in assessing the magnitude of the returns to the various
components of human capital, namely the returns to general and speciﬁc human capital (as deﬁned
in Becker (1964)). While there is a consensus about the role of education in the formation of human
capital, there is little agreement about the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. That is, the human
capital speciﬁct ot h eﬁrm at which a worker is employed. Typically in the literature ﬁrm-speciﬁc
h u m a nc a p i t a li sp r o x i e db yt e n u r eo nas p e c i ﬁc job. Consequently, it is hard to disentangle the
returns to ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital from the returns to general human capital, as is measured
by one’s labor market experience.
In general, workers’ wages can change through two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, channels.
Workers can stay in the same ﬁrm for some years and collect the returns to their ﬁrm-speciﬁch u m a n
capital (seniority). Alternatively, they can change jobs because of an outside wage oﬀer that exceeds
the wage at their current job. There has been an ongoing debate in the literature as to which of the
two alternatives contribute to observed wage growth among individuals in the U.S. Topel (1991)
claims that there are signiﬁcant returns to seniority, while Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Altonji
and Williams (2005) claim that there are very little returns to seniority, if at all, in the U.S.
In this study, we revisit the question regarding the magnitude of the returns to seniority in the
U.S. and oﬀer a new perspective. Our starting point is the same as that taken by virtually all papers
in the literature on this topic. That is, we adopt the general Mincer’s wage speciﬁcation. To account
for the endogenous decisions of participation and mobility, we extend the model of Hyslop (1999)
by adding a dynamic optimization search perspective. This model gives rise to two structural
decision equations, namely: (1) a participation-employment equation;1 and (2) an interﬁrm mobility
equation. In this approach, experience and seniority are fully endogenized because they are direct
outcomes of the employment and interﬁrm mobility decisions, respectively. Hence, in order to
obtain consistent estimates for the parameters of the wage function, one must estimate it jointly
with the employment and mobility equations. Estimating this model accounts for the potential
selection biases that stem from the (endogenous) employment and mobility decisions. Because
the selection eﬀects are quite complex, it is not possible to ex-ante assess the overall impact on
estimated returns to experience and seniority; this is largely an empirical question to which we
devote the analysis in this paper.
To control for other potential sources of bias, we also allow the three estimated equations to
include person-speciﬁc random correlated eﬀects as well as idiosyncratic components. To be as
ﬂexible as possible, we impose no restrictions on the covariance structure between the various
stochastic elements. It is well known in the literature that modeling unobserved heterogeneity is
generally very important in capturing aspects of human behavior. It turns out that this is of vital
importance in our case as well. In particular, unobserved heterogeneity creates important links
1In both the theoretical model and the empirical analysis, participation is the same as employment. We therefore
use these two terms interchangeably throughout the paper.
1between individuals’ various decisions that, if ignored, can lead to severe biases in the estimated
parameters of interest. That is, the employment and mobility decisions are correlated with the
outcome of interest, i.e., wage, in part through the correlation between the person-speciﬁc unob-
served components. In addition, the employment and mobility equations include lagged decisions
as explanatory variables, controlling for potential state dependence that is implied by the model
described below.
Our approach oﬀers a uniﬁed framework with which one can address the re-examined results
found in the literature. This is because the statistical assumptions we make–along with endoge-
nizing seniority and experience–incorporate the most important elements from previous studies,
particularly those by both Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2005).2
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate the model for three
educational groups: High school dropouts, high school graduates, and college graduates. We adopt
a Bayesian approach and employ Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods which allows us
to estimate the joint posterior distribution of all the model’s parameters.
The results indicate that, while the estimated returns to experience are somewhat higher than
those previously found in the literature, they are of similar magnitude. In complete contrast,
the estimates of the returns to seniority are much higher than those previously obtained, even
higher than those obtained by Topel (1991). Moreover, they are large and signiﬁcant for all ed-
ucation groups. Consequently, our estimates of the total within-job wage growth are signiﬁcantly
higher than Topel’s estimates and all other results reported in the literature (e.g., Altonji and
Shakotko (1987), Abraham and Farber (1987), and Altonji and Williams (2005)).
The results also demonstrate the vital importance of explicitly incorporating the employment
and the mobility decisions, which, in turn, deﬁne experience and seniority. We show that the dif-
ferences between our estimates and those obtained in previous studies are the direct consequence of
two important factors. The ﬁrst factor is insuﬃcient control for unobserved heterogeneity prevailing
in the various decisions. This factor has important implications for the implied choices of alterna-
tive career paths. The other factor is the lack of direct modeling of the job-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n to f
wages. In the formulation of the wage equation in this study, we introduce a function that serves as
a summary statistic for the individual’s speciﬁc career path. This function permits discontinuous
jumps in individuals’ wages when they change jobs. We ﬁnd that the estimates change markedly
when this function is included. This clearly indicates, as is illustrated below, that the timing of a
job change in one’s career matters a great deal.
Because our ﬁndings are very diﬀerent from those previously obtained in the literature, we
provide a number of robustness checks. For example, we start the estimation centering the prior
distributions for the relevant parameters around the results obtained by Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
and by Topel (1991). It turns out that the results obtained are identical using either prior. Also, we
use a somewhat diﬀerent sample than the one used by Topel (1991) and Altonji and Shakotko (1987).
However, we ﬁnd very clear evidence that the substantially distinct results we obtain are not driven
2There are a number of other papers in the literature, including Dustmann and Meghir (2005) and Neal (1995),
who analyzed similar questions but took diﬀerent routes. We discuss them below.
2by this fact. When we apply the methods adopted by Topel (1991) and Altonji and Shakotko (1987),
we are able to very closely replicate their results using our data extract. In essence, the model we
develop here gives rise to both models, even though our model does not explicitly nest the other two
models. Hence, we are able to directly examine the assumptions previously made in the literature
and their implications on the results obtained.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review
of the literature and highlight the crucial diﬀerences between the various approaches. Section 3
presents the model, which extends Hyslop’s (1999) while incorporating other vital features from
the search literature. Section 4 follows with the econometric speciﬁcation. We also brieﬂyd i s c u s s
the key elements of the numerical techniques used for estimating the model. A brief discussion
of the data extract used in this study is provided in Section 5. Section 6 presents the empirical
results and discusses their implications. Section 7 follows with some concluding remarks. There
are also three appendices. Appendix A provides some mathematical details and proofs related
to the model. Appendix B provides the necessary details about the numerical algorithm used in
computing the posterior distribution of the model’s parameters. Appendix C presents a descriptive
analysis that gives rise to the modeling approach taken here and speciﬁcally the introduction of a
function summarizing an individual’s previous career path in the wage equation.
2 Literature Review
There has been a long lasting debate in the literature on the magnitude of returns to seniority in
the U.S. Topel (1991)’s results, indicating that there are large returns to seniority, stood in stark
contrast with previous literature. The most notable papers of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and
Abraham and Farber (1987) ﬁnd virtually no returns to seniority in the U.S.
Topel (1991) ﬁnds strong evidence that the costs of displacement are highly correlated with
prior job tenure. He goes on to argue that this phenomenon can stem from one of two potential
explanations: (a) wages rise with seniority; or (b) tenure merely acts as a proxy for the quality
of the job match.3 To examine this phenomenon, he uses the following prototype model of wage
determination:
yijt = Xijtβ1 + Tijtβ2 +  ijt, (1)
where yijt is the log wage of individual i in job j at time t, Xijt denotes experience, and Tijt denotes
seniority. The residual term  ijt is decomposed into three components:
 ijt = φijt + μi + vijt, (2)
where φijt is speciﬁc to the individual-work (or job) pair, μi is a term that reﬂects the individual’s
ability, while vijt is an idiosyncratic term representing market-wide random shocks and/or mea-
surement error. The main problem in estimating the parameters of interest β1 and β2 stems from
3An additional possibility, not explored by Topel, is that workers with long tenures are simply more able.
3the fact that φijt is likely to be correlated with experience and/or tenure. In consequence, a simple
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression on (1) would give a biased estimate, say b β2,f o rβ2.T o p e l
provides a convincing argument regarding the composition of “movers” and “stayers” in the data
set. If the returns to seniority are positive, i.e., β2 > 0,t h e nb β2 will be downward biased.
It is crucial to note that, under Topel’s approach, experience at the entry level is assumed to
be exogenous and hence uncorrelated with the error terms. Under this assumption, Topel is able
to obtain an unbiased estimate for β1 +β2 and an upward biased estimate for β1 (due to selection
bias induced by not modeling the mobility decisions). Hence, he argues that his estimate of β2,
b β2 = .0545, provides a lower bound for the returns to seniority.4
In contrast, Altonji and Shakotko (1987) (AS, hereafter) use an instrumental variables approach
assuming (in Topel’s notation) that φijt = φij, i.e., the individual job-speciﬁc term is time-invariant.
Under this assumption, deviation of seniority from its average in a speciﬁc job is a valid instrument
for seniority. Since this method is (as shown by Topel (1991)) a variant of his two-step approach,
it is not surprising that the estimate for β1 + β2 obtained by AS is similar to that obtained by
Topel. Nevertheless, AS’s procedure appears to induce an upward bias in the IV estimate for β1,
and hence a downward bias in the estimate for β2. This problem is potentially magniﬁed by a
measurement error problem in the tenure data that exists in AS. Diﬀerences in treatment of time
trends in the regression is yet another factor contributing to substantial diﬀerences in the estimates
of the returns to tenure.5
Abraham and Farber (1987) (AF, hereafter) have a diﬀerent set of assumptions. In particular,
they use completed tenure to proxy unobserved dimensions of the individual’s, or job’s, quality.
A problem with their approach is that many of the workers in the extract they use have censored
spells of employment.6
Altonji and Williams (2005) (AW, hereafter) specify a model closer in spirit to Topel’s (1991)
model. However, the two approaches do diﬀer in some meaningful ways, leading to substantial
diﬀerences in the estimated returns to seniority. AW rely crucially on the assumption that the match
eﬀect φ and time are independent (i.e., Cov(t,φ)=0 ), conditional on experience (or experience
and tenure). This assumption is problematic, especially in cases when workers have had more time
to ﬁnd jobs with higher φ.M o r e o v e r ,t may also be correlated with μ in (2) because of changes in
the sample composition.
One important conclusion that comes up from both Topel (1991) and AW is that individual
heterogeneity is an important factor of the wage growth process. Hence, it appears that a large
part of the reduction in the upward bias of the estimate found by Topel (1991) is due to a reduction
in the bias that stems from individual heterogeneity.
4Topel (1991) also examines two additional sources of potential biases in the estimates of β1 + β2. Nevertheless,
he ﬁnds that accounting for these potential biases has a very small eﬀect on the estimate for β2.
5T o p e lu s e sas p e c i ﬁc index for the aggregate changes in real wages using data from the CPS., while AS use
a simple time trend. Consequently, growth of quality of jobs, because of better matches over time, will cause an
additional downward bias in the estimate for β2.
6Another source of diﬀerence arises because AF use a quadratic in experience when estimating the log wage
equation, whereas AS and Topel use a quartic speciﬁcation.
4In a recent paper, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) (DM, hereafter) allow for three diﬀerent sources
of returns due to accumulation of speciﬁc human capital, namely experience, sector-speciﬁcs e n i o r -
ity, and ﬁrm-speciﬁcs e n i o r i t y . 7 To estimate the returns to experience, they focus their attention
on data of displaced workers in their new jobs, assuming that such workers cannot predict closure
of an establishment (more than a year in advance).8 Furthermore, it is crucial to assume that
displaced workers have preferences for work similar to those that induce their sectorial choices.
In consequence, controlling for the endogeneity of experience also controls for the endogeneity of
sector tenure. In a subsequent step of their analysis, DM estimate two reduced-form equations, one
for experience and the other for participation. The residuals from these two regressions are used
as regressors in the wage regression of the displaced workers (and a similar procedure is applied
for seniority). This procedure allows DM to account for possible sample selection biases that are
induced by restricting attention to only the individuals staying with their current employer. In this
sense, our approach is similar to theirs. Using data from Germany and the U.S., DM ﬁnd that the
returns to tenure for both skilled and unskilled workers are large. While the estimated returns to
sector-speciﬁc tenure are much smaller, they are also statistically signiﬁcant.
In his survey paper, Farber (1999) notes the importance of modelling some speciﬁc features of
the mobility process, an element which is generally missing from the papers discussed above. For
instance, he shows that in the ﬁrst few months of a job, there is an increase in the probability of
separation, while this probability decreases steadily thereafter. To fully understand this process,
person heterogeneity and duration dependence must be distinguished. Farber gives strong evidence
that contradicts the simple model of pure unobserved heterogeneity. He also ﬁnds strong evidence
that ﬁrms choose to lay oﬀ less senior workers, suggesting that speciﬁc ﬁrm-capital matters, as
theory implies. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that job losses result in substantial permanent earnings
losses (see also Gibbons and Katz (1991) for a further discussion of this point).
In our investigation of the returns to seniority and experience in the U.S., we adopt some of the
speciﬁcations described above, while expanding the model in new directions, namely modelling of
the participation and mobility decisions directly.
3 The Model
In this section, we consider a theoretical model that, under some suﬃcient conditions, generates
ﬁrst-order state dependence in the participation and mobility processes. Whether or not state
dependence plays a major role is an empirical question that is examined thoroughly below. The
model adopted is an extension of Hyslop’s (1999) model. We augment his model with a key feature
from the search literature, in that we allow a worker to move directly from one job to another.
We show that job-to-job transitions may occur under some suﬃcient (but fairly general) conditions
7Neal (1995) and Parent (1999, 2000) also focus their investigation on the importance of sector- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital. We abstract from the sector-speciﬁc returns in order to avoid modeling sectorial choices, as yet
another equation, and focus on ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm mobility.
8For more on the empirical ﬁndings in the literature on displaced workers see also Addison and Portugal (1989),
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), and Farber (1999).
5that generate ﬁrst-order dependence in the participation and mobility processes. These conditions
involve the values and properties of three main parameters of the model, namely the search cost,
the mobility cost, and the utility function. The individual decision to stay either non-employed or
employed in the same ﬁrm for at least one more period, as well as the decision to move from one
ﬁrm to another, are then shown to depend on the existence and the values of diﬀerent reservation
wages. More precisely, we show that, in each of three labor market states (non-employment and
employment with and without interﬁrm mobility), there exist three threshold wage levels that
generate the decision either to stay in the same state for at least one more period or to make a
transition towards one of the two other states in the next period. The values of these reservation
wages are state-dependent, which means that their values depend on the state actually occupied
by the worker. This theoretical result allows us to build a structural econometric model with two
selection decisions (one for participation and one for interﬁrm mobility) and a wage equation. The
structure of this econometric model, which is diﬀerent from a switching regression model with
two distinct wage equations (one for interﬁrm movers and one for stayers in the ﬁrm), is a direct
consequence of our speciﬁc assumptions.
The wage function: Our theoretical model builds on the same general speciﬁcation of the wage
function that has been adopted in the literature. That is, the observed log wage equation for
individual i in job j at time t is:
wit = w∗




where 1(·) is the usual indicator function and yit =1if the ith individual participates in the labor
force at time t,a n dyit =0otherwise. That is, the wage oﬀer w∗
it is observed only for the individuals
who decide to work. The term xwit is a vector of observed characteristics–including education,
labor market experience, and seniority (or tenure)–of the individual in their current job, just as
in Topel (1991), AS, and AW. We diﬀer in our modeling of the stochastic term εit.W ed e c o m p o s e
εit into three components:
εijt = JW
ijt + αwi + ξit. (4)
The term αwi is a person-speciﬁc correlated random eﬀect, analogous to μi in (2), while ξit is a
contemporaneous idiosyncratic error term. The term JW
ijt, analogous to the term φijt in (2), serves
as a summary statistic for the individual’s work history. More speciﬁcally, JW
ijt is the sum of all
discontinuous jumps in one’s wage that resulted from all job changes until date t.9 The jumps are
allowed to diﬀer depending on the level of labor market experience and seniority at the points of
9In Section 6, we provide strong evidence from the descriptive statistics of the data that justiﬁes the introduction
of the J
















where d1itl equals 1 if the lth job of the ith individual lasted less than a year and equals 0 otherwise.
Similarly, d2itl =1if the lth job of the ith individual lasted between 2 and 5 years, and equals 0
otherwise, d3itl =1if her lth job lasted between 6 and 10 years, and equals 0 otherwise, d4itl =1
if her lth job lasted more than 10 years and equals 0 otherwise. The φ-coeﬃcients do not vary
across individuals. Finally, Mit denotes the number of job changes by the ith individual who is in
job j at time t (not including the individual’s ﬁrst sample year). If an individual changed jobs in
his/her ﬁr s ts a m p l ey e a rt h e ndi1 =1 ,a n ddi1 =0otherwise. The quantities et and st denote the
experience and seniority in year t, respectively.11
Note that the JW
ijt function generalizes φijt, and it captures the initial conditions speciﬁct ot h e
individual at the start of a new job. The inclusion of job market experience in previous jobs as a
determinant of the initial earnings at the time of a job change allows one to distinguish between
displaced workers, who went through a period of non-employment after displacement, from workers
who move directly from one job to another. Furthermore, the inclusion of the seniority level at the
end of each of the past jobs allows us to control for the quality of the previous job matches. Whether
or not the frequency of changing jobs and the individual’s labor market attachment matters is an
empirical question that we address below.12
Timing of the decisions:
We assume that a worker who is employed in period t receives a wage oﬀer from his/her current
ﬁrm. Given this oﬀer, he/she may decide at the end of period t to either stay in the ﬁrm or leave
a n dm o v et oad i ﬀerent ﬁrm, or alternative to become non-employed.13 At the end of period t,
he/she does not know with certainty the wage that the new ﬁrm will oﬀer him/her but can form an
10In a diﬀerent context Light and Ureta (1995) also address the timing issue, but with respect to experience. They
discuss the role of experience in the early stages of one’s career and highlight the importance of controlling for the
exact timing of work experience when estimating wage regressions.
11Note that the speciﬁcation for the term J
W
it introduces thirteen diﬀerent regressors in the wage equation. These
regressors are: a dummy for job change in year 1, experience in year 0, the numbers of job changes that lasted up
to one year, between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years, or more than 10 years, seniority at last job change that
lasted between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years, or more than 10 years, and experience at last job change that
lasted less than one year, between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years, or more than 10 years.
12Also, note that J
W
ijt is individual-job speciﬁc. In general, there are several ways for deﬁning a job. Our deﬁnition
of a job is that of a particular employment spell in one’s career. Hence, it is possible that diﬀerent individuals will
have the same values for J
W
ijt, even though they may not be employed in the same ﬁrm. For example, two workers
could have entered the labor market at the same date after leaving school, and both could have occupied two diﬀerent
jobs of similar lengths (say, six months each) during the following year, before moving to a new ﬁrm. Nevertheless,
this deﬁnition of a job is consistent with our modelling approach.
13Strictly speaking, our model does not allow us to distinguish between layoﬀs and quits. Thus a more appropriate
reference to use is separation. A separation happens when an unexpected low wage is oﬀered by the current employer
in period t. Such an event can be interpreted as a negative exogenous shock on the individual’s productivity in the
current ﬁrm. In turn, this will induce a move to the non-employment state or, alternatively, to another ﬁrm. This
interpretation is consistent with the available information in our data set, which does not allow us to distinguish
between involuntary and voluntary job changes.
7expectation about that wage using the wage determination process given in (3)-(5). For simplicity,
we assume that in this case an outside wage oﬀer will arrive with probability 1 in the next period.14
If a worker decides to move to a new ﬁrm at the end of period t, then he/she incurs the cost cM,
paid at the beginning of period t +1 .15 As it turns out, this assumption induces ﬁrst-order state
dependence in the participation and mobility processes. While it is obvious that some components
of these costs are paid at time t, it is just as obvious that other components of these costs are paid
at period t +1 . The need for adjustments induces some moving costs that are incurred only after
moving. Typically, costs that will be incurred at time t+1are transaction costs and non-monetary
costs associated with reconstructing social capital in a new workplace and family environment.16
The model’s structure:
At any given period t a non-participant may search for a job at a cost γ1 per period, paid at
the beginning of the next period. This search cost is assumed to be strictly lower than the mobility
cost cM. While this assumption is not testable, it is reasonable to assume that moving to a new
ﬁrm entails higher costs than getting a job when unemployed. This is because an individual who
works has ﬁrst to quit and then to incur the moving cost which is at least as high as the cost of
moving from unemployment to a new job. Indeed, the literature provides strong support for this
assumption. For example, Hardman and Ioannides (2004) argue that the high moving costs, both
in terms of out-of-pocket costs and the loss of location-speciﬁc social and human capital, explain
why there are infrequent moves of individuals. We further assume that hours of work are constant
across all jobs, so that we can concentrate only on the extensive margin of the participation process
yt, which takes the value 1 if the individual participates in period t and takes the value 0 otherwise.
Each individual is assumed to maximize the discounted present value of the inﬁnite lifetime




βs−tEt [u(Cs,y s;Xs)], (6)
where u(·) is the current period ﬂow of utility from consumption, Ct, and leisure, lt =1− yt,
conditional on a vector of (observed and unobserved) exogenous individual characteristics Xt.T h e
term β i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r .T h en o t a t i o nEt (·) denotes that the expectation is taken conditional
on the information available at time t. Assuming neither borrowing nor lending, the period-by-
14One can also account for the costs associated with searching for an outside wage oﬀer. Since the main theoretical
results hold under this speciﬁcation as well, we assume for simplicity that there are no such costs. Equilibrium search
models with costly on-the-job search and outside job oﬀers are developed, for instance, in Bontemps, Robin and Van
den Berg (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). However, Nagypal (2005) shows that such models with on-
the-job search do not generally match the extent of job-to-job transitions. Consequently, she develops an alternative
theoretical framework that presents some similarities with our model. In particular, Nagypal (2005) incorporates a
stochastic process that causes the value of a job to the worker to decrease at times, predicting that workers with a
lower job value have a higher probability of entering unemployment. Nevertheless, further comparison between our
approach and search equilibrium models is still beyond the scope of our paper.
15It is assumed that a departure from a ﬁrm has to be announced at the end of period t.M o r e o v e r , t h e r e i s n o
possibility of recall from the current employer.
16For ease of exposition, we assume that all the costs are incurred at t +1 . This assumption does not change any
of the conclusions derived here.
8period budget constraint is given by
Ct = zt + wtyt − γ1 (1 − yt−1) − cMmt−1, (7)
where the price of consumption in each period is normalized to 1, zt is non-labor income, wt is the
individual’s wage oﬀer, mt−1 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the individual moved
to a new job at the end of t − 1 and takes the value 0 otherwise.
By virtue of Bellman’s optimality principle, the value function at the beginning of period t,
given participation yt−1 and mobility mt−1 in period t − 1,i sg i v e nb y
Vt (yt−1,m t−1;Xt)=m a x
yt,mt
{u(Ct,y t;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (yt,m t;Xt+1)]}. (8)
If the individual does not participate at t − 1, i.e., yt−1 =0(and hence mt−1 =0 ), the value
function at the beginning of period t is










t (0,0;Xt)=u(zt − γ1,0;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (0,0;Xt+1)],
V 1
t (0,0;Xt)=u(zt + wt − γ1,1;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (1,0;Xt+1)], and
V 2
t (0,0;Xt)=u(zt + wt − γ1,1;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (1,1;Xt+1)],
where V 0
t (0,0;Xt) denotes the value of non-participation in period t, V 1
t (0,0;Xt) denotes the
v a l u eo fp a r t i c i p a t i n gw i t h o u tm o v i n ga tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt,a n dV 2
t (0,0;Xt) denotes the value of
participating and moving at the end of period t.
To better understand (9), note that:
1. Non-participation in period t implies that yt =0and hence mt =0 . Thus, from (7), the
budget constraint in period t is reduced to Ct = zt − γ1, and the value function at the
beginning of period t +1is Vt+1 (0,0;Xt+1).
2. Participation in period t without moving at the end of period t corresponds to yt =1and
mt =0 . Thus, the budget constraint in this period is Ct = zt+wt−γ1, and the value function
at the beginning of period t +1is Vt+1 (1,0;Xt+1).
3. Participation in period t and moving at the end of this period corresponds to yt =1and
mt =1 . Thus, the budget constraint in period t is Ct = zt + wt − γ1, and the value function
at the beginning of period t +1is Vt+1 (1,1;Xt+1).
For a “stayer”, i.e., a participant who stays in his/her job at the end of period t−1 (i.e., yt−1 =1
9and mt−1 =0 ), the value function at the beginning of period t is












t (1,0;Xt)=u(zt + wt,1;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (1,0;Xt+1)], and
V 2
t (1,0;Xt)=u(zt + wt,1;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (1,1;Xt+1)].
Similarly, for a “mover”, i.e., a participant who moves to a new job at the end of t − 1,t h ev a l u e
function at the beginning of period t is










t (1,1;Xt)=u(zt − cM,0;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (0,0;Xt+1)],
V 1
t (1,1;Xt)=u(zt + wt − cM,1;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (1,0;Xt+1)], and
V 2
t (1,1;Xt)=u(zt + wt − cM,1;Xt)+βEt [Vt+1 (1,1;Xt+1)].
The interpretations of (10)—(11) are similar to those of (9). Transitions to the non-participation
state will occur if the wage oﬀer in period t is less than the minimum of two alternative reservation
wages, namely the wage levels that equate the value function of non-participation with that of
participation, without and with interﬁrm mobility. These two reservation wages, denoted by w∗
01,t
and w∗







































+ βEt [Vt+1 (1,1;Xt+1)].
It follows immediately from (12) then that
w∗
02,t ≶ w∗
01,t ⇔ Et [Vt+1 (1,0;Xt+1)] ≶ Et [Vt+1 (1,1;Xt+1)].
From here, our analysis extends the one set forth by Burdett (1978). As in Burdett (1978), we








t (1,k;Xt),k =0 ,1. (13)
If w∗
02,t <w ∗
01,t, then there exists a wage value, denoted w∗
03,t, that equates the value function
of participation without interﬁrm mobility in period t with that of participation with interﬁrm














Then the decision rule for a non-participant is to accept any wage oﬀer greater than w∗
02,t,a n d
either to move to another ﬁrm in the next period, if the current wage is between w∗
02,t and w∗
03,t,




02,t, then the optimal strategy for a non-participant is to accept any wage oﬀer greater
than w∗
01,t, and to stay in the ﬁr mf o ra tl e a s to n em o r ep e r i o d( s e eF i g u r eA . 2i nA p p e n d i xA . 1 ) . 17
The reservation wages for a stayer in period t − 1, denoted by w∗
11,t and w∗
12,t, respectively, are
the wage levels that equate the value function of non-participation with those of participation, with















For this stayer, if w∗
12,t <w ∗
11,t, the reservation wage w∗
13,t that equates the value function of
participation without interﬁrm mobility in period t with that of participation with interﬁrm mobility
















11,t, the decision rule for a stayer is to accept any wage oﬀer greater than w∗
12,t,
a n de i t h e rt om o v et oa n o t h e rﬁrm in the next period, if the current wage is between w∗
12,t and
w∗




12,t, then the optimal strategy for a stayer is to accept any wage oﬀer greater than w∗
11,t,
a n dt os t a yi nt h eﬁrm for at least one more period.



































21,t. Then, if w∗
22,t <w ∗
21,t, the decision rule for a mover is to accept any wage oﬀer
greater than w∗
22,t, and either to move to another ﬁrm in the next period, if the current wage is
between w∗
22,t and w∗




22,t, then the optimal strategy for a mover is to accept any wage
oﬀer greater than w∗
21,t, and to stay in the ﬁr mf o ra tl e a s to n em o r ep e r i o d .
17For more details see Burdett (1978, Propositions 1 and 2, p. 215).
11Summary of events and decisions:
Inter-ﬁrm mobility may occur when w∗
02,t <w ∗
01,t,w h i c h ,e m p i r i c a l l y ,i st h em o s tr e l e v a n tc a s e
for our econometric analysis. It this case, the events unfold as follows:
• A worker who is not employed in period t − 1 has to pay the search cost γ1 at the beginning
of period t for receiving a wage oﬀer w∗
t at time t (from the wage oﬀer function deﬁned in
(3)—(4)). He/she will accept the wage oﬀer at t if it is greater or equal to a given threshold
value w∗
02,t that is deﬁned in (12), or otherwise he/she will decline the oﬀer and continue to
search.
• An employed worker who moved to another ﬁrm at the end of period t−1 pays the mobility
cost cM at the beginning of period t.I np e r i o dt he/she receives a wage oﬀer from his/her new
employer. If that wage oﬀer is lower than the threshold value w∗
22,t, the worker will become
a non-participant at the end of period t. If the wage oﬀer is higher than the threshold value
w∗
23,t, then the optimal strategy for this worker is to accept this (inside) oﬀe ra n ds t a yi nt h e
ﬁrm for at least one more period (i.e., he/she becomes a stayer in period t). If the wage oﬀer
falls between w∗
22,t and w∗
23,t, then the optimal strategy is to move to another ﬁrm at the end
of period t.
• An employed worker who decided to stay in the same ﬁrm at the end of period t − 1 also
receives a wage oﬀer from his/her current employer in period t.I ft h a to ﬀer is lower than the
threshold value w∗
12,t, the worker will become a non-participant at the end of period t.I ft h e
wage oﬀer is higher than the reservation wage w∗
13,t, then the optimal strategy for this worker
is to accept this inside oﬀe ra n dt os t a yi nt h eﬁrm for at least one more period. If this oﬀer
falls between w∗
12,t and w∗
13,t, then the optimal strategy is to move to another ﬁrm at the end
of period t (i.e., the worker becomes a mover in period t).
In Appendix A.2, we show that the reservation wages of a stayer in period t may be deduced from






































12and u0(·) denotes the per-period marginal utility of consumption. The reservation wages of a mover
in period t may be deduced from the three other pairs of reservation wages through the relationships:
w∗
21,t ≈ w∗




02,t − γ12 + γ22 ≈ w∗
12,t + γ22, and
w∗
23,t ≈ w∗



































Note that in principle all the γ coeﬃcients deﬁned above can vary across individuals. Since it is
n o tp o s s i b l et oe s t i m a t et h e s ec o e ﬃcients separately from their population means along with all the
other parameters of the model, we only estimate the average of these coeﬃcients. This is why it is
crucial for us to control for individual correlated random eﬀects, because essentially they capture
the deviation of the individual-speciﬁc γ’s from the average in the population.
These relationships are then used to derive the two suﬃcient conditions below. These conditions
are crucial for establishing the results of our theoretical model, since they characterize the situations
in which: (1) interﬁrm mobility may occur; and (2) the participation and mobility processes exhibit
ﬁrst-order dependence. These two conditions rely on the existence of threshold values associated
with the individual decision to become a non-participant, a mover, and a stayer. The proofs of
these two conditions are given in Appendix A.3.
Condition 1 When w∗
02,t <w ∗
01,t the participation and mobility equations exhibit ﬁrst-order state
dependence: (a) if, at any level of consumption, the marginal utility of consumption is either higher
















Condition 2 When w∗
01,t <w ∗
02,t the participation equation exhibits ﬁrst-order state dependence:
(a) if, at any level of consumption, the marginal utility of consumption is either higher or lower
















13In Appendix A.3. we show that the terms in square brackets in (19) and (20) are larger than 1.
That is, Conditions 1 and 2 are stronger than the assumption we previously made that cM >γ 1.
Therefore, the conditions stated above require that the mobility cost cM,w h i c hi si n c u r r e di nt h e
period after the move occurred, be relatively high for the participation and mobility processes to
demonstrate ﬁrst-order state dependence (see Hardman and Ioannides (2004)). These suﬃcient
conditions are more likely to be valid if, alternatively, the search cost γ1 is relatively low, or if
the utility function u is weakly concave. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile emphasizing that these
conditions are only suﬃcient,a n dn o tnecessary, in order to have w∗
22,t >w ∗
02,t.
When Condition 2 holds there is no inter-ﬁrm mobility. A non-participant becomes employed
(respectively, remains non-participant) at the end of period t if he/she is oﬀered a wage greater
(respectively, lower) than w∗
01,t. A participant becomes a non-participant (respectively, remains
employed) if he/she is oﬀered a wage less (respectively, higher) than w∗
11,t.W h e n t h e m a r g i n a l
utility of consumption is the same in the employment and non-employment states, the solution is
similar to that in which the marginal utility of consumption is lower when working. (For more
details see points B and D in Appendix A.3). Thus, Conditions 1 and 2 suﬃce for this situation as
well.
When interﬁrm mobility may occur, i.e., when w∗
02,t <w ∗
01,t, we show in Appendix A.3 that
a mover at the end of period t − 1 becomes a non-participant at the end of period t if he/she is
oﬀered a wage less than w∗
22,t. A stayer becomes a non-participant if he/she is oﬀered a wage less
than w∗







































As t a y e ra tt − 1 may decide to move to another ﬁrm at the end of period t if he/she is oﬀered
a wage w∗
t such that w∗
12,t <w ∗
t <w ∗
13,t, but he/she will stay in his/her current job for at least one
more period if w∗
t >w ∗
13,t. On the other hand, a mover at t−1 will decide to move again at t only
if the wage oﬀer is such that w∗
22,t <w ∗
t <w ∗
23,t and he/she will stay in his/her current job for at
least one more period if w∗
t >w ∗
23,t. Consequently, the decision to stay in the current ﬁrm at the
end of period t can be characterized by the indicator variable st deﬁned as:
st =1 − mt = 1
£
wt >w ∗






13,t − γ23 yt−1 mt−1 > 0
¤
,
where mt is the indicator variable indicating whether the worker i decides to move, i.e., mt =1 ,o r
14not to move, i.e., mt =0 ,a tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt.












13,t + γ23 yt−1 mt−1 − JW
jt − x0
wtδ0 − αw − ξt > 0
¤
· 1(yi,t−1 =1 ,y it =1 ) , (24)
where the reservation wages w∗
02,t and w∗
13,t are determined implicitly by (12) and (16), respectively.
Generally, the analytical solutions for w∗
02,t and w∗
13,t are intractable. To circumvent this diﬃ-
culty, we assume that they can be approximated arbitrarily closely by linear functions of the entire








mtb13 + d13 yt−1 mt−1 + α13 + ξ13,t, (26)
where xyt and xmt are sets of observable covariates. For identiﬁcation purposes some of the co-
variates in xyt and xmt are excluded from xwt, the set of covariates in the wage function deﬁned
in (3).18 The terms α02 and α13 are person-speciﬁc correlated random eﬀects, while ξ02,t and ξ13,t
are idiosyncratic contemporaneous errors.
Substituting (25) and (26) into (23) and (24), respectively, yields the following participation












mtλ0 + λm yt−1 mt−1 + αm + vt > 0
¤
· 1(yi,t−1 =1 ,y it =1 ) , (28)
where a0 ≡ 1−a02, a1 ≡ a13 −1, βy ≡ γ12 −c02, βm ≡− γ22 −d02, λm ≡ γ23 +d13.F o rβ0 we have
β0 ≡ δ0 − b02 for all variables both in xwt and in xyt,a n dβ0 ≡− b02 for the covariates in xyt but
excluded from xwt. Similarly, for λ0 we have λ0 ≡ b13 −δ0 for all variables both in xwt and in xmt,
and λ0 ≡ b13 for the covariates in xmt but excluded from xwt. Note that the stochastic terms are
given by
αy ≡ αw − α02,α m ≡ α13 − αw,u t ≡ ξt − ξ02,t, and vt ≡ ξ13,t − ξt.
Note also that, by construction, the three person-speciﬁce ﬀects, i.e., αy,α m,a n dαw, are correlated,
as is the case for the three contemporaneous white noises, i.e., ut, vt,a n dξt. In addition, the
(individual) random terms αy, αm,a n dαw aﬀect the wage in (3) in two ways. First, the wage
is aﬀected directly (through αw). Second, it is aﬀected indirectly (through αm and αy). Hence,
all these random terms also aﬀect the reservation wages w∗
02,t and w∗
13,t. Essentially, these random
terms account for an individual’s unobserved heterogeneity. This speciﬁcation would be suﬃcient to
18The excluded variables in this study are similar to those previously used in the literature, and they include the
individual’s marital status, the number of children in the family and non-labor income. We return to this point later
in the text.
15estimate the model through classical inference methods, such as (simulated) maximum likelihood
procedures. But, in a broader sense, our Bayesian econometric approach, which will be presented
in the next section, enlarges the scope of individual heterogeneity by assuming that the slope
coeﬃcients (including γ12, γ22 and γ23) are randomly drawn (from normal distributions). However,
these parameters are not separately identiﬁed from αy, αm,a n dαw.S ow ec a nt h i n ko fγ12, γ22
and γ23 as population means.
4 Econometric Speciﬁcation and Estimation
4.1 Econometric Speciﬁcation
Before proceeding with the econometric speciﬁcation, it is convenient to rewrite the model as
follows:
The participation (employment) equation, at any date t>1,i sg i v e nb y 19
yit = 1(y∗




yitβ0 + βyyi,t−1 + βmmi,t−1 + αyi + uit.
The interﬁrm mobility equation, at any date t>1,i sg i v e nb y 20
mit = 1(m∗




mitλ0 + λmmi,t−1 + αmi + vit. (30)
The wage equation, for any date t,i sg i v e nb y :
wijt = w∗




ijt + αwi + ξit.
The terms y∗
it and m∗
it denote the two latent variables aﬀecting the employment and mobility
decisions, respectively. Note that an obvious implication of the deﬁnition of a move is that a
worker cannot move at date t unless he/she participated at both t − 1 and t.
Initial Conditions:
The likelihood function for the ith individual, conditional on the individual’s speciﬁce ﬀects
19Note that the labor market experience is simply the sum of the individual sequence of yit. A si sc o m m o ni n
the literature, we make no distinction in this speciﬁcation between unemployment and non-participation in the labor
force. In addition, as mentioned earlier, we equate participation and being employed.
20Mobility takes place at the beginning of period t. And seniority is the sum of the individual sequence of mit with
his/her current employer.
16αi =( αyi,α mi,α wi)0 and the exogenous variables xit =( x0
yit,x 0
mit,x 0
wit)0,i sg i v e nb y
l
n











× l{wi1|αi,x i1,y i1,m i1}l{yi1,m i1},
where the last term of the right hand side of (32) is the likelihood of (yi1,m i1) for the initial state
at time t =1 . Following Heckman (1981), we approximate this part of the likelihood by a probit
speciﬁcation given by
yi1 =1 ( y∗
i1 ≥ 0), where y∗
i1 = axyi1 + δyαyi + ui1, and (33)
mi1 =1 ( m∗
i1 ≥ 0) × 1(yi1 =1 ) , where m∗
i1 = bxmi1 + δmαmi + vi1,
and αyi and αmi are the individual speciﬁce ﬀects in the participation and mobility equations
deﬁned in (29) and (30), respectively. That is, δy and δm are allowed to diﬀer from one.
Note that in order to obtain estimates for the model’s parameters one needs also to integrate
the likelihood function in (32) over the distribution of the individual speciﬁce ﬀects, which makes
the estimation for some of the groups infeasible. Hence, in the analysis reported below, we adopt
a Bayesian approach whereby we obtain the conditional posterior distribution of the parameters,
conditional on the data, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods as explained below.21
Stochastic Assumptions:
We assume that the individual speciﬁce ﬀects are stochastically independent of the idiosyncratic
shocks, that is αi ⊥ (uit,v it,ξit).F u r t h e r m o r e ,αi follows the distribution given by
αi ∼ N(f (xi1,...,x iT),Γi), where (34)
Γi = Di∆ρDi,
Di = diag(σyi,σmi,σwi), and
{∆ρ}j,l = ραjiαli, for j,l = y,m,w.
The function f (xi1,...,x iT) depends, in principle, on all exogenous variables in all periods.
This can be seen from the expression of its statistical counterpart, that is the mean of the posterior
distribution of the individual speciﬁce ﬀects αi (see Appendix B). The matrix Γi is indexed by i,
s i n c ew ea l s oa l l o wf o rσji to be heteroskedastic, i.e., to depend on xyit, xmit,a n dxwit, respectively.
21One can also use an alternative (“frequentist”) approach such as Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) (e.g.
Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996), McFadden (1989), and Pakes and Pollard (1989)). However, the maximization is
rather complicated and highly time consuming. For comparison we estimated the model using the SML method only
for one group (the smallest one) of college graduates. The estimation took several months. Nevertheless, the point
estimates for all the model’s parameters obtained by the SML are virtually the same as the mean of the joint posterior
distribution of the model’s parameter, inducing identical estimates for the main parameters of interest, namely the




ji =e x p( hj (xi1,...,x iT)), for j = y,m,w, (35)
where each hj(·) is some real valued function. The ultimate goal in doing so is to control for
the possible existence of heterogeneity in a parsimonious way. Hence, we base our estimation
only on the ﬁrst three principle components of the sample averages of the regressors’ vector, i.e.,
xji =(
PT
t=1 xjit)/T (as well as a constant term) for each individual. That is, we approximate
hj (xi1,...,x iT) by22
b hj(xji1,...,x jiT)=pc0
ib γj, (36)
where pci is the vector containing the ﬁrst three principal components. This signiﬁcantly reduces
the computational burden because the posterior distribution for γ =( γ0
y,γ0
m,γ0
w)0 is diﬃcult to
obtain, and it requires a complicated Metropolis-Hastings step.23
Finally, the idiosyncratic error components from (29), (30), and (31), i.e., τit =( uit,v it,ξit)0,
are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated white noises, with












and for identiﬁcation purposes, we have normalized the variance of uit and vit to be σ2
u = σ2
v =1 .
4.2 Estimation–Computing The Posterior Distribution
Since it is analytically intractable to compute the exact posterior distribution of the model’s pa-
rameters, conditional on the observed data, our goal here is to summarize the joint posterior dis-
tribution of the parameters of the model using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm.
Appendix B provides a detailed description of the implementation of the MCMC simulation. Here
we only touch upon the key issues.
Let the prior density of the model’s parameters be denoted by π(θ),w h e r eθ contains all the
parameters of the model as deﬁned in detail below. The posterior distribution of the parameters
would then be:
π(θ | z) ∝ Pr(z | θ)π(θ),
where z denotes the observed data. This posterior density cannot be easily simulated due to the
intractability of Pr(z | θ). Hence, we follow Chib and Greenberg (1998) and augment the parameter








in (29), (30), and (31), respectively.
22The ﬁrst three principle components account for over 98% of the total variance of xji, so that there is almost no
loss of information by doing so.
23We do not attempt to attribute any causal interpretation to e γj, j = y,m,w, but rather to control for possible
dependence of the covariance matrix on observed characteristics of the individual.
18With this addition it is easier to implement the Gibbs sampler, which iterates through the
set of the conditional distributions of z∗ (conditional on θ)a n dθ (conditional on z∗).24 In all
the estimations reported below we employed 50,000 MCMC repetitions after the ﬁrst 5,000 were
discarded. As recommended by Gelfand and Smith (1990), the performance of the algorithm and
its approach to the stationary distribution are assessed by monitoring the evolution of the quantiles
as the sampling proceeds.
A key element for computing the posterior distribution of the parameters is the choice of the
prior distributions for the various elements of the parameter space. We adopt here conjugate, but
very diﬀuse, priors on all the parameters of the model, reﬂecting our lack of knowledge about the
possible values of the parameters. In all cases we use proper priors (although very dispersed) to
ensure that the posterior distribution is a proper distribution.
A comprehensive sensitivity analysis that we carried out shows that the choice of the particular
prior distribution hardly aﬀects the posterior distribution. In particular, we estimated the model
centering the key parameters around the results obtained by Topel (1991) and AS. The resulting
posterior distributions obtained under both scenarios were virtually identical.
5T h e D a t a
We follow Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2005) and use the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of individuals
in the U.S. and the family units in which they reside. The survey, begun in 1968, emphasizes
the dynamic aspects of economic and demographic behavior, but its content is broad, including
sociological and psychological measures.
Two key features give the PSID its unique analytic power: (i) individuals are followed over
very long time periods in the context of their family setting; and (ii) families are tracked across
generations, where interviews of multiple generations within the same families are often conducted
simultaneously. Starting with a national sample of 5,000 U.S. households in 1968, the PSID has
re-interviewed individuals from those households every year, whether or not they are living in the
same dwelling or with the same people. While there is some attrition rate, the PSID has had
signiﬁcant success in its recontact eﬀorts.25
The data extract used in this study comes from 18 waves of the PSID from 1975 to 1992. The
sample is restricted to all heads of households who were interviewed for at least three years during
the period from 1975 to 1992 and who were between the ages of 18 and 65 in these survey dates.
We include in the analysis all the individuals, even if they reported themselves as self-employed.
We also carried out some sensitivity analysis, excluding the self-employed from our sample, but the
24A presentation of the theory and practice of Gibbs sampling and Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods may be
found in the book written by Robert and Casella (1999), and in the survey by Chib (2001). In econometrics, recent
applications to panel data include the papers by Geweke and Keane (2000), Chib and Hamilton (2002) and Fougère
and Kamionka (2003).
25There is a large number of studies that use this survey for many diﬀerent research questions. For a more detailed
description of the PSID, see Hill (1992).
19results remained virtually the same. Furthermore, most of the heads of household in the sample are
men. We therefore conducted an additional analysis dropping all women household heads from the
estimation. Again, no visible diﬀerences have been detected in the results obtained. We excluded
from the extract all the observations which came from the poverty sub-sample of the PSID.
There are some diﬃculties that need to be carefully addressed with some of the key variables
of our analysis and especially with the tenure variable. As noted by Topel (1991), tenure on a job
is often recorded in wide intervals, and a large number of observations are lost because tenure is
missing. There are also a large number of inconsistencies in the data inducing tremendous spurious
year-to-year variance in reported tenure on a given job. For example, between two years of a single
job tenure sometimes falls (or rises) by much more than one year. The are many years with missing
tenure followed by years in which a respondent reports more than 20 years of seniority.
Since the errors can basically determine the outcome of the analysis, we reconstructed the tenure
and experience variables using the exact procedure suggested by Topel (1991). Speciﬁcally, for jobs
that begin in the panel, tenure is started at zero and is incremented by one for each additional
year in which the person works for the same employer. For jobs that started before the ﬁrst year
a person was in the sample, a diﬀerent procedure was followed. The starting tenure was inferred
according to the longest sequence of consistent observations. If there was no such sequence then
we started from the maximum tenure on the job, provided that the maximum was less then the
age of the person minus his/her education minus 6. If this was not the case then we started from
the second largest value of recorded tenure. Once the starting point was determined, tenure was
incremented by one for each additional year with the same employer. The initial experience was
computed according to similar principles. Once the starting point was computed, experience was
incremented by one for each year in which the person worked. Using this procedure we managed
to reduce the number of inconsistencies to a minimum.26
Summary statistics of some of the key variables in the extract used here are reported in Table 1.
By the nature of the PSID data collection strategy, the average age of the sample individuals does
not increase much over time. The average education rises by more than half a year between 1975
and 1992, because the new individuals entering the sample have, on average, higher education that
those in the older cohorts. Also, experience and seniority tend to increase over the sample from
20.8 and 5.1 years in 1975 to 24.2 and 7.3 in 1992, respectively.
AW provide summary statistics for the samples used in the various studies (see Table 1 of AW).
The experience variable (line 2) used here seems to be very much in line with that reported in
other studies. However, there is a substantial diﬀerence between the tenure variable used here and
that used by Topel and especially AW. The main reason for this discrepancy is the fact that we
restrict the sample to individuals for whom we can obtain consistent data for three consecutive
years. Individuals with lower seniority are also those that tend to leave the PSID sample more
frequently. Nevertheless, we provide below strong evidence that the diﬀerences in the results are
26We also took a few other additional cautionary measures. For example, we checked that: (i) the reported
unemployment matches the change in the seniority level; and (ii) there are no peculiar changes in the reported state
of residence and region of residence, etc. The programs are available from the corresponding author upon request.
20not due to selection of inherently diﬀerent data extracts, but rather because of the approach.
The mobility variable (line 5) indicates that, in each of the sample years, between 6.5% and
14.1% of the individuals changed jobs. The mobility is very large in the ﬁrst year of the sample,
probably due to measurement error. Since it is diﬃcult to identify whether or not a person actually
moved in those early years, it is necessary to control for initial conditions as was explained above.
Consistent with other data sources, the average real wage increased slightly over the sample
years. This is mainly because the individuals entering the sample have wages that are increasing
over time in real terms, while those who leave the sample have wages that decrease somewhat
over the sample years. More importantly, note that the wage dispersion increases across years.
Also consistent with other data sources, the participation rate of individuals in the sample (almost
exclusively men) decreases steadily over the sample years from about 92% in 1975 to 86% in 1992.
The PSID oversamples non-whites. However, since the results change very little when we use a
representative sample, we keep all the individuals satisfying the conditions speciﬁed above.
Approximately 20% of the sample have children who are two years old and below, although
this fraction slightly decreases over the sample years, as does the fraction of the sample that has
children between the ages of 3 and 5. The total number of children also declines somewhat over
the sample period. This is consistent with the general ﬁnding in the literature about the decline in
t h es i z eo ft h et y p i c a lA m e r i c a nf a m i l y .
Note that there are substantial changes in the distribution of cohorts over the sample period.
The fraction of people in the youngest cohort increases steadily, in particular between 1988 and
1990, as does the number of observations, and the fraction of Hispanics.27 In contrast, the fraction
of people in the oldest cohorts decreases over the sample years.
6T h e R e s u l t s
The estimation is carried out for three separate education groups. The ﬁrst group includes all
individuals with less than 12 years of education, referred to as high school (HS) dropouts.T h e
second group consists of those who are high school graduates, who may have acquired some college
education, and/or who may have earned a degree higher than high school diploma, but have not
completed a four-year college. We refer to this group as high school graduates. The third group, the
college graduates, consists of those that have at least 16 years of education and who have earned
a college degree. Below we present the results from the simultaneous estimation of participation-
employment, mobility, and wage equations, together with the initial conditions, for each group. For
brevity we do not report the estimates for the initial conditions’ equations.
Speciﬁcation:
The participation-employment equation includes the following variables: a constant, education,
quartic in lagged labor market experience, a set of three regional dummy variables, a dummy vari-
27Those in charge of the PSID made a special eﬀort to collect information for those who left the sample in the
previous years. The changes in the age and race structure are due to strong geographic mobility of these young
workers.
21able for residence in an SMSA, family unearned income, dummy variables for being an African
American and for being Hispanic, county of residence unemployment rate, a set of variables pro-
viding information about the children in the family, a dummy variable for being married, a set of
four dummy variables for the cohort of birth, and a full set of year indicators. In addition we also
include the JW function, as explained above.28
The mobility equation includes all the variables that are included in the participation equation.
In addition it includes a quartic in lagged seniority on the current job and a set of nine industry
indicator variables.
The dependent variable in the (log) wage equation is the log of the deﬂated annual wage. Instead
of the quartic in lagged experience and lagged seniority, we include in the wage equation a quartic
in experience and a quartic in seniority on the current job. Several variables which appear in the
participation and mobility equations are excluded from the wage equation. These are the family
unearned income, the number of children in the family, the number of children aged between 1
and 2, the number of children aged between 3 and 5, and a marital status dummy variable that
takes the value 1 when the individual is married and zero otherwise. The excluded variables from
the wage equation listed above are assumed to be exogenous with respect to the model. These
exclusion restrictions provide an additional source for identifying the wage regression parameters,
in addition to the identiﬁcation that comes from the non-linearity of the model.29
It is worthwhile noting that the identiﬁcation of the various parameters of the model comes
from several sources of variation in the data. First, given that experience and seniority have
been explicitly modeled, the cross-sectional dimension makes it possible for one to estimate all the
parameters in the three equations if there are no individual speciﬁce ﬀects. Nevertheless, the time
dimension of our data extract also helps in identifying the key parameters, namely the returns to
experience, and, even more importantly, the returns to seniority. That is, there are a considerable
number of individuals who changed jobs at some point during the sample period and did so at
diﬀerent points of their life-cycle. The time dimension in the data set also allows us to identify the
individual speciﬁce ﬀects speciﬁed in Section 3. This is why we restrict our data extract to include
only individuals who have at least three consecutive years in which they are observed during the
sample period. Since in our model experience and seniority are fully endogenized, and since we also
explicitly control for the individuals’ initial conditions, one need not impose further restrictions on
the data extract (e.g. to include only exogenously displaced workers) as is done in Dustmann and
Meghir (2005) or Topel (1991).
T h em a i nr e s u l t sa r ep r o v i d e di nT a b l e s2t h r o u g h8 . I nT a b l e s2a n d3 ,w eb r i e ﬂyd e s c r i b e
the estimates for the participation and mobility equations, respectively.30 We then concentrate our
28In Appendix C we present descriptive statistics from the raw data that justify the introduction of the J
W function,
as well as our preferred speciﬁcation.
29We follow the large literature on labor supply in doing so. For extensive discussion of these exclusion restrictions,
see Mroz (1987).
30It turns out that the marginal distributions of all the parameters of the model, and all the marginal and cumulative
returns to experience and seniority, are very close to those of normal random variables. Therefore, it is suﬃcient
to report, as we do, the mean and the standard deviation for all the relevant posterior distributions. For that very
r e a s o nw ea l s od on o tp r o v i d ea n yﬁgures for the posterior marginal distributions. In addition, for brevity we do not
22discussion on the returns to human capital, namely education, experience, and, most importantly
for this study, the returns to seniority. In Table 4 we provide the results for the wage equation
from which the various marginal and cumulative returns can be computed. These are provided
in Tables 5 and 6 for experience and seniority, respectively. Table 7 presents a comparison of
our results with those of AW. Finally, Table 8 reports estimates of some of the key parameters
associated with the stochastic terms of the model.
Results we obtain are very diﬀerent, especially for the returns to seniority, from those previously
presented in the literature. A natural question to ask then is whether or not these apparent
diﬀerences stem simply from a diﬀerent data extract. To examine this question we re-estimated the
models of Topel (1991) and AW using our data extract. The results of this investigation are clear-
cut: the diﬀerences between our results and theirs are not due to the use of diﬀerent data extracts,
or auxiliary decisions that have little to do with the methods employed. The diﬀerences stem from
three elements: (a) the speciﬁc modelling strategy adopted here (namely the joint estimation of
participation, mobility and wage outcomes); (b) the explicit control for individual-speciﬁce ﬀects
in the three equations; and (c) the introduction of the JW function that captures past employment
spells.
6.1 Participation-Employment and Mobility
As explained above, these two equations take into account both duration dependence and unob-
served heterogeneity. In the participation equation we include lagged participation and lagged
mobility, whereas the mobility equation only includes lagged mobility. In principle, the adopted
speciﬁcation requires the inclusion of the JW function as deﬁn e di n( 5 )i nb o t ht h ee m p l o y m e n t
and mobility equations.
However, inclusion of the JW function in these two equations does not change the results in
any meaningful way. First, all the coeﬃcients associated with the elements of the JW function are
statistically and economically insigniﬁcant.31 Second, the inclusion of the JW function has no eﬀect
on any of the other model’s parameters. For these reasons we simply exclude the JW function from
both participation and mobility equations.
Participation-employment:
The estimates are in line with those previously obtained in the literature and are consistent
with the classic human capital theory. Education is an important factor in the participation-
employment decision for the more educated and has no eﬀe c to nh i g hs c h o o ld r o p o u t s . S i m i l a r
qualitative results are also obtained for experience, which seems to be more important for the more
educated individuals.
Lagged employment has a positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect for all three education groups
explicitly report the estimates of the coeﬃcients on the year indicators (all tables). We also omit the results for the
industry indicator variables in Table 3.
31This result implies that slope parameters a1 and a2 associated with the J
W function in the reduced-form equations
(27) and (28) are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This is equivalent to accepting the null hypothesis that structural
parameters a02 and a13 associated with J
W in equations (25) and (26) are both equal to 1.
23in the participation-employment equation. Similar results are also obtained for lagged mobility,
namely individuals who move from one job to another in any given period are more likely to be in
employment in the following period. Moreover, as predicted by human capital theory, the latter
eﬀect is stronger for the least educated individuals.
The results for the family variables are, in general, consistent with economic theory (in particular
marital status and the children variables). The coeﬃcients for the race indicators are particularly
striking. While African-Americans are less likely to participate at all education levels, the negative
eﬀect appears to be particularly large for the high school dropouts and high school graduates. On
the other hand, Hispanics appear to have very similar behavior to the whites. Finally, younger
cohorts are more likely to be employed than older ones.
Mobility:
For all education groups the level of experience appears to be largely irrelevant for the mobility
decision. In contrast, the eﬀect of seniority is very strong and negative. This result implies that
more senior workers tend to move less because the returns to seniority, which represent returns to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, are lost once a person leaves his/her job. Moreover, mobility in any
given period considerably reduces the probability of a move in the subsequent period. This eﬀect
is particularly strong for the more educated individuals, potentially because the signalling eﬀect of
repeated frequent moves may be more severe for the more educated individuals.
Interestingly, among the family variables, family unearned income seems be the only consistent
factor aﬀecting the likelihood of a move. Moreover, when evaluated at the average level of unearned
income for the group, the marginal eﬀect of unearned family income on the probability of a move
is roughly the same for all groups. Finally, race does not seem to play a major role in mobility
decisions (except for the very educated blacks).
6.2 The Returns to Education
In this subsection and those that follow we turn to the estimates from the wage equation. The
(within-education groups) returns to education, reported on line (2) of Table 4, are broadly consis-
tent with the human capital theory. Declining marginal returns to education lead to lower returns
to education for the college graduates than for the high school graduates. However, the mar-
ginal returns are larger for the high school graduates than for the high school dropouts, 4.8% and
2.5%, respectively. These results appear to be consistent with recent ﬁndings in the literature (e.g.
Card (2001)) about the within-education group returns to education.32 Nevertheless, the estimates
obtained here are somewhat lower than those reported by Card (2001). It turns out that, once one
controls for the selection eﬀects, due to the participation and mobility decisions, the estimated re-
turns to education are substantially reduced, potentially also explaining that the returns are larger
for high school graduates than for high school dropouts and lower for college graduates than for
the high school graduates. We return to this eﬀect below when discussing the estimates associated
32There is substantial variation within each group of education as we deﬁned them. This variation allows one to
separately identify the within-group returns to education for the three groups.
24with the stochastic terms of the model.
6.3 The Returns to Experience
The results for the returns to experience, which are based on the estimates reported in Table 4,
are provided in Table 5. The results in Panel A of Table 5 are based on the quartic model in both
experience and seniority. In Panel B of Table 5 we provide an additional set of estimates based on
the quadratic model in experience and seniority.
The results in Panel A of the table are close, yet generally larger, than those previously obtained
in the literature. In particular, they are slightly larger than those obtained by Topel (1991), AS and
AW. Topel’s estimate, i.e., Topel (1991, Tables 1 and 2), of the cumulative returns to experience
at 10 years of experience is .354. The estimates of AS range between .372 and .442, while those of
AW range between .310 and .374. Our estimates are .362 for the high school dropouts, .402 for the
high school graduates, and .661 for the college graduates. These results also indicate that there are
substantial diﬀerences across the various educational groups at all levels of experience. Even only 5
years after entering the labor market, the cumulative returns for college graduates are almost twice
as large as those for the other two groups.
Note also that the cumulative returns to experience are substantially lower for the quadratic
models, as is indicated by the results reported in Panel B of Table 5. For example, at 10 years
of experience the cumulative returns for the three educational groups are .246, .253, and .446,
respectively, substantially lower than for the quartic model.
In Panels C and D of Table 5 we report the results for the quartic and quadratic model when
the JW function deﬁned in (5) is omitted. Omitting the JW function induces a huge reduction in
the estimated cumulative returns to experience for all educational groups. Given that the estimates
of the parameters associated with the JW function (see rows 11—23 of Table 4) are jointly highly
signiﬁcant, this clearly highlights the importance of controlling for past job market history. Indeed,
failing to account for past changes in employment status and job mobility induces a severe upward
bias on the estimated returns to experience.
It is essential to see that, unlike in Topel (1991), AS, and AW, we allow for the possibility of
non-zero correlations between the various individual-speciﬁce ﬀects in the participation, mobility
and wage equations. It turns out that failure to control for these non-zero correlations also induces
signiﬁcant biases on the estimated returns to experience. This becomes clear from the discussion
below regarding the estimates of the parameters that correspond to stochastic elements of the
model.
6.4 The Returns to Seniority
The returns to seniority reported in Panel A of Table 6 (for the quartic model) are higher than
those previously reported in the literature, including those reported by Topel (1991). This is true
for all educational groups at all levels of seniority. In fact, the support of the marginal posterior
distributions for the returns to seniority is entirely in the positive segment of the real line for all
25groups. The returns also increase dramatically with the level of seniority: At 2 years of seniority
t h e ya r ea r o u n d1 3 % ,r i s i n gt oa b o u t5 0 %a t1 0y e a r sof seniority. The results for the quadratic
model, reported in Panel B of Table 6, are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the quartic
model. One diﬀerence is that for the least educated group the cumulative returns tend to ﬂatten
at 10 years of seniority.
In Panels C and D of Table 6 we report the estimated returns to seniority for the two models
when the JW function is omitted from the wage equation. The resulting estimates, especially those
reported in Panel C, are much lower than those reported in Panels A and B. This clearly highlights
the need for one to control for past labor market history, as we do via the JW function. Overall, the
average cumulative returns over the three education a lg r o u p sa r e ,a so n em i g h te x p e c t ,r e m a r k a b l y
close to those obtained by Topel.
One key reason for the diﬀerence between our results and Topel’s (1991) results is the treatment
of experience. As mentioned above, Topel treats the experience level at new jobs as exogenous.
There is strong evidence in the literature (e.g. Farber (1999)) indicating that this is not the case.
The results presented above for the mobility equation indicate that experience plays a major role
in the mobility decision and hence is highly correlated with the level of experience in a new job, for
those who move. Indeed, when we treat experience as exogenous (and hence omit the participation
equation from the estimation), the resulting returns to seniority are reduced. Nevertheless, they
are still signiﬁcantly higher than those obtained by Topel. If, in addition, we omitted the JW
component from the wage equation, the resulting estimates for the returns to seniority are reduced
even further.
The cumulative returns to experience and seniority presented above for the various model spec-
iﬁcations (i.e., quartic versus quadratic and with and without the JW function) indicate that the
sum of the returns from experience and seniority are quite similar across the various speciﬁca-
tions (but larger than previously obtained in the literature). Indeed, since seniority and experience
are positively correlated, and more so for the more educated individuals, larger returns to one
component are therefore associated with lower returns to the other.33
To summarize our results and to compare them with the literature, Table 7 presents results
from AW (their Table 2) in its ﬁrst panel. This panel provides the returns to seniority at 2, 5,
10, and 15 years of seniority using OLS and IV estimates based on AW’s methodology using the
Topel replication sample for the period 1968-1983. The second panel presents the results using our
sample for the period 1975-1992. We present two sets of columns, the ﬁrst one for high school
dropouts and the second for college graduates. The ﬁrst two rows of this panel provide the returns
at 2, 5, 10, and 15 years of seniority using OLS and AW’s methodology. The last four rows of
the panel present the returns (already reported in Table 6) from our analyses. The results are
extremely clear. The OLS returns to seniority in the two samples are very close (slightly lower
for college graduates). A similar conclusion can be drawn from the IV estimates based on AW’s
methodology. Hence, the diﬀerences in results are due to the diﬀerences in methodology, not data.
33The correlation coeﬃcients between experience and seniority are: .22 for the high school dropouts, .36 for the
high school graduates, and .46 for the college graduates.
26Finally, the last four rows of the lower panel indicate that the diﬀerent results obtained in our
analyses are not consequences of using diﬀerent samples. Quite the contrary, our sample yields very
similar results when we use the same methodology as has been previously used in the literature.
It clearly appears that the joint modelling of wages, employment, and mobility, as well as the
introduction of the JW function, strongly aﬀects the estimated returns to seniority.
6.5 The JW Function
As explained above, the JW function is an individual-job speciﬁc function that parsimoniously
summarizes changes in one’s wage that correspond to a particular career path. The parameter
estimates of the JW function, provided in rows 11 through 23 of Table 4, clearly indicate the
importance of controlling for the individual’s career path. Even though some of the individual
parameters are statistically insigniﬁcant, the null hypothesis that all coeﬃcients are zeros is rejected
at any reasonable signiﬁcance level for all three educational groups.
Some important implications emerge from these results. First, the timing of a move in a worker’s
career matters. For all three groups the JW function increases with seniority in the previous job.
While at the time of a move a person loses the accumulated returns to seniority, he/she also receives
the associated premium coming from the relevant component of the JW function. Consider, for
example, a high school dropout with 10 years of seniority and 10 year of experience moving to a
new job. The results in Panel A of Table 6 indicate that he/she loses .507 in log-wage. But from
Table 4 we see that he/she gains .026 × 10 = .26 (line 15), for an overall substantial wage loss of
about 25%. This loss captures the so-called displaced worker eﬀect analyzed in the literature. The
eﬀect of unemployment spells during one’s career is captured through the (actual) labor market
experience.
Note that for high school dropouts the components of the JW function associated with expe-
rience are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (see lines 20 through 23 of Table 4). By contrast,
a college-educated worker changing jobs after 10 years of seniority would lose .477 of accumulated
returns to seniority (see Table 6, Panel A), but he/she also regains .517 from the JW function
(Table 4, line 16). A college-educated worker changing jobs after only two years in a job loses .136
log wage points (Table 6, Panel A) but gains through the JW function .157 log points from the
constant component (line 14) and additional .108 log points from the part proportional to seniority
(line 17). That is, the eﬀect of seniority at these low levels is economically large and positive.
In contrast, there is a small negative eﬀect associated with the experience component of the JW
function for the most highly educated workers. Finally, the high school graduates do not seem to
lose overall from seniority for spells of at least 10 years in a ﬁrm, but the experience component
in the JW function seems to have a large negative eﬀect on the wage changes at the time of a job
change.
It is worth noting that the estimation of the JW function is made possible only because we
explicitly endogenize both experience and seniority. Moreover, the JW function allows us to control
for the indirect eﬀects of experience and seniority that stem from previous jobs and introduce a
27non-linear interaction between seniority and experience. In particular, it allows us to explicitly
model the ﬁrst few years on the labor market. The results indicate that this plays a crucial role in
explaining wage growth (see also Topel and Ward (1992)).
Our model consists of a complex combination of factors aﬀecting the estimated returns to
experience and seniority, so it is hard to be able to assess the overall eﬀect on the estimated
returns. The results generally support the results and conjectures of Topel (1991). However, we
also ﬁnd that there is a clear need for controlling for the highly non-linear role of the individual’s
career path, as is demonstrated by the vastly diﬀerent results obtained from the quartic models
without the JW function (see Panels A and C of Tables 5 and 6). Additional diﬀerences in the
estimated returns are induced by the joint modeling of the three outcome equations as is discussed
in the next subsection.
6.6 Estimates of the Stochastic Elements
In Table 8 we provide estimates of the key parameters associated with the stochastic elements of
the model, that is the parameters of Σ in (38) and the correlation parameters of ∆ρ in (34). Recall
that we impose very few restrictions on either Σ or ∆ρ. Hence, it is crucial to examine the estimated
correlations of the random elements across the various equations. In general, whether or not the
estimated correlations are diﬀerent from zero determines whether it is necessary to control for the
participation and mobility decisions when estimating the wage equation.
For the correlations between the various person-speciﬁc components, i.e., the elements of ∆ρ,
we see that most of them are highly signiﬁcant and very large in magnitude. This is especially true,
as one might expect, for the high school and college graduates. Since higher participation rates
imply faster accumulation of labor market experience, the estimates of ραyαw( i nr o w6 )i m p l yt h a t ,
all other things equal, high-wage workers (i.e., workers with a large person-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n ti n
the wage equation) tend to be more experienced workers. Hence, omission of the person-speciﬁc
eﬀect from the wage equation would induce an upward bias in the estimated returns to experience.
However, because of the positive correlation between the person-speciﬁce ﬀects in the participation
and wage equations, failing to control for the participation decision would induce a downward
bias on the (positive) returns to experience. The net eﬀect of these two conﬂicting eﬀects is
a priori not clear. Overall, we ﬁnd that these two eﬀects almost cancel each other out, leading to
estimated returns to experience which are only somewhat larger than those previously obtained in
the literature (e.g. Topel (1991), AS, and AW).
The correlations between the participation-employment and the mobility components, i.e.,
ραyαm(in row 5), and between the mobility and the wage components, i.e., ραmαw(in row 7), are very
large and negative for high school graduates and college graduates. That is, high-mobility workers
also tend to be low-wage workers and low-participation workers. Moreover, high-wage workers have
higher seniority than low-wage workers. Hence, omitting the person-speciﬁce ﬀect from the wage
equation, in absence of any control for mobility (and participation) decisions, would induce an up-
ward bias in the estimated returns to seniority. Also, because of the negative correlation between
28the two person-speciﬁce ﬀects, failing to control for the mobility decision would induce a downward
bias in the returns to seniority. Consequently, the net eﬀect is not clear. Empirically we ﬁnd that
the overall eﬀect of controlling for the mobility and participation decisions, and the inclusion of
person-speciﬁce ﬀects in the various equations, as well as the presence of the JW function, is huge,
leading to estimated returns to seniority which are larger than those estimated by Topel (1991).
Finally, examining the estimated Σ, we see that ρuξ, i.e., the correlation between the idiosyn-
cratic errors in the participation-employment and wage equations, is negative and highly signiﬁcant
for all education groups. By contrast, and mostly for the college-educated workers, positive shocks
to mobility are associated with positive shocks to wages. Other correlations in Σ are not statistically
signiﬁcant and are generally small in magnitude.
6.7 Implications for Long-run Wage Growth
Because of the complexity of the various components at play in our model, it is somewhat diﬃcult
to assess the overall eﬀects of various participation and mobility episodes on wage growth. To
better address this issue, we follow the wage growth for two types of hypothetical workers with
two distinct career paths. One group consists of those working through the entire sample period in
one ﬁrm, while the other includes those working in one ﬁrm for the ﬁrst four years, then accepting
a new job in which the worker stays for the remainder of the sample period (with no intervening
unemployment episode). Figures 1 and 2 depict the results for the high school graduate and college
graduate groups, respectively.34 Results for new entrants, i.e., those who in the ﬁr s ts a m p l ey e a r
have 5 years of experience and 2 years of seniority, for the two alternative career paths are given
in Figures 1a, 1c, 2a and 2c, respectively. Results for workers that start (ﬁrst sample year) with
15 years of experience and 6 years in the employing ﬁrm are presented similarly in Figures 1b, 1d,
2b, and 2d. In all ﬁgures we decompose the wage growth that stems from returns to human capital
into the part that comes from rising experience and the part that comes from rising seniority. The
terms associated with the JW function are also included in the initial wage of the worker at the
entry point to a new ﬁrm.
First, consistent with human capital theory, wage growth early in one’s career is large, and more
signiﬁcantly so for the more educated individuals. This eﬀect is reinforced when the components
coming from the JW function are incorporated. For example, wage growth over the 18-year period
for new entrants with a high school degree (Figure 1a) is 0.74 log points, whereas for new entrants
with a college degree it is 0.94 log points. This is in addition to the fact that the starting wage for
college graduates is higher (Figure 2a).
Furthermore, for both education groups, wage growth that stems from increased seniority is
larger than wage growth that stems from increased experience. For the college graduate group
(workers with no job change) the increases due to seniority and experience are 0.59 and 0.35 log
points, respectively, for the new entrants, and 0.50 and -0.08, for the experienced workers. The
34Since the pattern of the results for the high school dropouts is very similar to that of the high school graduates,
we omit it for brevity.
29diﬀerences for the high school graduates (workers with no job change) are even larger. For the new
entrants, the respective increases are 0.59 and 0.16 log points, while for the experienced workers, the
respective increases are 0.48 and -0.04 log points. These results imply that the loss of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills, as represented by seniority, leads to a substantial decrease in one’s wage.
In general there are two eﬀects that come into play when there is a job change. On one hand,
there are direct losses due to lost returns to accumulated seniority. On the other hand, there are
discrete jumps in the entry wage level at the new job, which are summarized in the JW function.
For high school graduates with little labor market experience, the loss of accumulated seniority is
compensated almost entirely by a discrete increase in the base wage (Figure 1c). This is even more
pronounced for new entrants with a college degree, for whom the loss of accumulated seniority is
more than compensated by the change in the entry wage level (Figure 2c). Hence, movements early
in a career appear to be favored by employers. In contrast, workers with substantial labor market
experience (15 to 20 years) after a relatively long spell within a ﬁrm incur substantial wage loss
when they change employers. For example, the implied loss for high school graduates with 9 years
of seniority due to loss of accumulated seniority is 0.45 log wage points. Nevertheless, the discrete
change in the base wage at the new job is composed of: (a) a ﬁxed increase of 0.19 log wage points
(Table 4, line 15); (b) a variable increase proportional to seniority at point of change of 0.16 log
wage points (Table 4, line 18); and (c) a variable loss of 0.06 (Table 4, line 22) due to career eﬀect
(i.e., experience at the moment of mobility). The overall eﬀect is a loss of approximately 0.16 log
points (Figure 1d). The loss for college graduates with substantial labor market experience and a
long tenure spell is somewhat smaller (Figure 2d).
7 Summary and Conclusions
Various theories in economics, and especially the well-known human capital theory, predict that
wage compensation should rise with seniority in a ﬁrm. The existence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
may explain the prevalence of long-term relationships between employees and employers. While
the various theories have very similar implications, there is much disagreement about the empirical
evidence. In a seminal paper, Topel (1991) examines this fundamental question and ﬁnds that
there are signiﬁcant returns to seniority. This ﬁnding provides strong support for the theoretical
literature on human capital and optimal labor contracts. Furthermore he argues that, if anything,
his estimates are likely to be downward biased. This ﬁnding stands in stark contrast with most of
the previous studies in the literature. By and large, most studies have concluded that, at best, the
evidence supporting positive returns to seniority is weak. In particular, Altonji and Williams (2005)
conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and ﬁnd negligible, and largely insigniﬁcant,
returns to seniority.
In this study we re-open the debate on the returns to seniority, while adopting new methodolog-
ical advancements that allow us to take a new, and more convincing, look at this issue. In contrast
to other studies, we explicitly model the joint decisions of participation and job mobility, along
with the key outcome, namely the wage outcome. We start with the same general Mincer’s wage
30speciﬁcation as previously adopted by the literature, while allowing for potential sample selection
biases that stem from the participation and mobility decisions of individuals. These estimating
equations are the structural counterpart of our theoretical model, an extension of Hyslop (1999)
with the addition of elements from the job search theory. Our strategy allows us to more rigor-
ously examine the question about the magnitude of the returns to seniority in the United States.
Moreover, it allows us to demonstrate the reasons for the diﬀerences between the results previously
obtained in the literature and compare them with our ﬁndings. In particular, we introduce random
correlated person-speciﬁce ﬀects in all three equations. We also allow these terms to be correlated
across equations. This speciﬁcation, along with the fact that we allow the idiosyncratic terms in
the three equations to be correlated, makes it possible to trace the implied biases that stem from
estimating the wage equation by itself.
We use a data extract similar to that used by both Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2005),
namely the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We resort to a Bayesian estimation, which
extensively uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, allowing one to compute the posterior dis-
tribution of the model’s parameters. Whenever possible we use uninformative prior distributions
for the parameters and hence rely heavily on the data to determine the posterior distributions of
these parameters. We perform our analysis on three educational groups: (a) high school dropouts;
(b) high school graduates; and (c) college graduates.
The results are unequivocal: We ﬁnd that the returns to seniority are large and highly signiﬁcant
for all three educational groups. In fact, the support of the posterior distribution of the returns to
seniority is entirely in the positive segment of the real line for all three educational groups. Our
results clearly demonstrate the importance of jointly estimating the wage equation along with the
participation-employment and mobility decisions. These two decisions have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the
observed annual earnings. Moreover, we ﬁnd that in addition to the direct eﬀects of experience and
seniority on one’s wages, there is a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the individual’s speciﬁc career path through
the aﬀect on the starting wage at a new job. Because careers diﬀer widely across workers with
otherwise similar backgrounds, it seems crucial to take into account this feature when estimating a
wage equation. Overall, we ﬁnd very strong evidence supporting Topel’s (1991) claims, even though
some aspects of our modeling strategy are closer to Altonji and Williams (2005).
We ﬁnd that several factors aﬀect the results considerably. First, estimating the model with and
without taking into account the workers’ careers paths provides very diﬀerent results. Nevertheless,
the various speciﬁcations only change the magnitude of the results but do not change the qualitative
results. That is, the returns to seniority are large and signiﬁcant for all groups considered. Our
estimates of the returns to experience are somewhat larger, though at the same general order
of magnitude than those previously obtained in the literature. However, these ﬁndings are not
uniform across education groups; they are much higher for the college graduates than for the other
two education groups. In addition, the pattern of job-to-job mobility–as summarized by the non-
linear function JW–has a strong impact on wages at the entry stage in a new ﬁrm. This impact of
the career on entry wages diﬀers markedly across educationg r o u p s .I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eﬁnd that the
31timing of a move in a career matters. While early moves are most beneﬁcial to college-educated
workers, late moves are more detrimental to workers with lower education. Overall, wage growth is
achieved through a combination of wage increases within the ﬁr ma n db yi n t e r ﬁrm mobility. The
former is more important for wage growth of high school dropouts because of their lower returns
to experience. The latter is more important for college graduates, both because the returns to
seniority are larger during the ﬁrst years in a ﬁrm and because there is no penalty implied by
job-to-job mobility.
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35Appendix A–Mathematical Derivation
A.1 Graphical Representation of Value Functions
Enter Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 here.
A.2 Relationships Between Reservation Wages
























First-order Taylor series expansions of both sides of (39) around zt + w∗
















0j,t − γ1j, (40)



































is greater or smaller than u0 (zt,0;Xt). In contrast, if the marginal util-
































Again, ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansions of the left and right hand sides of (41) around zt +w∗
0j,t,
36zt + w∗































u(zt − cM,0;Xt) ' u(zt,0;Xt) − cM u0 (zt,0;Xt),






















Substitution of the expressions from (42) into (41) gives (for j =1 ,2):
w∗
2j,t ≈ w∗
0j,t − γ1j + γ2j ≈ w∗







































,t h e nγ2j can be positive or negative:



























and hence, γ1j < 0 and γ2j < 0.

























































































For determining the sign of γ13 (respectively, γ23), we need to know whether w∗
13,t (respectively.,
w∗
23,t) is lower or higher than w∗
03,t (respectively., w∗
13,t).
A.3 Proofs of Conditions 1 and 2




01,t and the marginal utility of consumption is higher when working: The


































































11,t.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e w∗
02,t <w ∗





(45), it follows that γ22 <γ 12 < 0. Consequently (43) implies then that w∗
22,t <w ∗
02,t,w h i c h
contradicts the initial assumption. Thus, w∗
22,t cannot be greater than w∗














and 0 <γ 11 <γ 12.






01,t.T w o c a s e s m u s t b e
considered then.




<u 0 (zt,0;Xt),t h e nγ22 < 0 and γ12 > 0. Thus γ22 −γ12 < 0,a n d
(43) implies then that w∗
22,t <w ∗
02,t, which contradicts the initial assumption.








































The expression in square brackets is greater than 1, and hence it is a stronger assumption than
cM >γ 1. Nevertheless, it is a suﬃcient condition to have w∗
22,t >w ∗






22,t,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed if γ21 >γ 22, a mover becomes a
non-participant at the end of period t if he/she is oﬀered a wage less than w∗
22,t. A stayer becomes
a non-participant if he or she is oﬀered a wage less than w∗
12,t, because w∗
12,t <w ∗
11,t.T h u s , t h e









02,t + γ12 yt−1 − γ22 yt−1 mt−1 > 0
¤
, (47)








t (1,k;Xt),k =0 ,1, (48)
then, for employed workers who were stayers and movers in period t − 1, there exists two wage
values, denoted w∗
13,t and w∗
23,t respectively, that equate the value function of participation without
interﬁrm mobility in period t with that of participation with interﬁrm mobility in period t.T h e s e



























Consequently, a stayer (at t−1) may decide to move to another ﬁrm at the end of period t if he/she
is oﬀered a wage w∗
t such that w∗
12,t <w ∗
t <w ∗
13,t, but he/she will stay in the current ﬁrm for at
least one more period if w∗
t >w ∗
13,t. On the other hand, a mover (at t − 1) will decide to move
again at t only if the wage oﬀer is such that w∗
22,t <w ∗
t <w ∗
23,t a n dh e / s h ew i l ls t a yi nt h eﬁrm for
at least one more period if w∗
t >w ∗
23,t. Consequently, the decision to stay in the current ﬁrm at
end of period t can be characterized by the dummy variable st deﬁned as:
st =1 − mt = 1
£
wt >w ∗






13,t − γ23 yt−1 mt−1 > 0
¤
,
where mt is the dummy variable indicating whether the worker i decides to move (mt =1 )or not
(mt =0 )at the end of period t.








, then (44) implies that γ11 < 0 <




11,t.N o t et h a tt w oc a s e sa r ep o s s i b l e .




<u 0 (zt,0;Xt),t h e nγ22 < 0. Thus γ22 − γ12 < 0 and (43) implies
that w∗
22,t <w ∗
02,t, which contradicts the initial assumption.








































In turn, (42) implies then that w∗
22,t >w ∗
02,t >w ∗
12,t,a n di fγ21 >γ 22, then w∗
21,t >w ∗
22,t.C o n s e -
quently, if condition (48) is veriﬁed, (47) and (49) are still valid.
A.2. If w∗
02,t >w ∗


























Again, two cases are possible.




<u 0 (zt,0;Xt), then (50) implies that 0 >γ 22 >γ 12. Then, (43)
implies that w∗
22,t >w ∗
02,t, which contradicts the assumption.




, then (50) implies that γ22 >γ 12 > 0. Then, (43)
implies that w∗
22,t >w ∗
02,t, which contradicts the above assumption.
Consequently, the assumption that w∗
02,t >w ∗
22,t cannot be true if the mobility cost cM is strictly
greater than the search cost γ1.
B. w∗
02,t <w ∗
01,t and the marginal utility of consumption is lower when working (or






<u 0 (zt,1;Xt) ≤ u0 (zt,0;Xt),j =0 ,1,2; l =1 ,2.
Moreover, if w∗
02,t <w ∗








<u 0 (zt,0;Xt),w h i c h

































´ < 0. (51)
































40Thus, (43) implies that w∗
02,t >w ∗
















Under this condition, (42) implies that w∗
12,t >w ∗
02,t >w ∗
22,t if 0 >γ 21 >γ 22. Then, w∗
21,t >w ∗
22,t
and, hence, if condition (48) is veriﬁed, (47) and (49) are still valid.
C. w∗
01,t <w ∗


















































, and (52) implies









21,t, it follows that









By (53), this inequality implies that γ21 <γ 11 < 0. Thus, (43) implies then that w∗
21,t <w ∗
01,t,w h i c h
contradicts the initial assumption. Hence, w∗
21,t cannot be greater than w∗














and 0 <γ 12 <γ 11.






02,t.T w o c a s e s m u s t b e
considered.




<u 0 (zt,0;Xt),t h e nγ21 < 0 and γ11 > 0. Thus γ21 − γ11 < 0,
and (43) implies that w∗
21,t <w ∗
01,t, which contradicts the initial assumption.








































As before the expression in square brackets is greater than 1, which is a stronger assumption than
cM >γ 1. Nevertheless, it is a suﬃcient condition to have w∗
21,t >w ∗




11,t. Now, assume that γ22 >γ 21,t h e nw∗
22,t >w ∗
21,t. In that case, there is
41no inter-ﬁrm mobility at t. That is, a non-participant becomes employed (respectively, stays in the
non-participation state) at the end of period t if he/she is oﬀered a wage greater (respectively, lower)
than w∗
01,t. A participant becomes a non-participant (respectively, remains employed) if he/she is
oﬀered a wage less than w∗









01,t + γ11 yt−1 > 0
¤
, (55)
with γ11 > 0.








, then (52) implies that γ12 < 0 <




12,t. Again, there are two possible cases.




<u 0 (zt,0;Xt),t h e nγ21 < 0. Thus, γ21−γ11 < 0, and (43) implies
that w∗
21,t <w ∗
01,t, which contradicts the initial assumption.












































if γ22 >γ 21,t h e nw∗
22,t >w ∗
21,t, and (55) is still valid.
C.2. If w∗
01,t >w ∗


























Note that there are two possible cases.




<u 0 (zt,0;Xt), then (56) implies that 0 >γ 21 >γ 11. Then, (43)
implies that w∗
21,t >w ∗
01,t, which contradicts the assumption above.




, then (56) implies that γ21 >γ 11 > 0. Then, (43)
implies that w∗
21,t >w ∗
01,t, which still contradicts the assumption above.
Consequently, the assumption w∗




02,t and the marginal utility of consumption is lower when working (or






<u 0 (zt,1;Xt) ≤ u0 (zt,0;Xt), for j =0 ,1,2; l =1 ,2.M o r e o v e r ,
if w∗
01,t <w ∗








<u 0 (zt,0;Xt).T h i si m p l i e st h a t
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Thus, (43) implies that w∗
01,t >w ∗
















Under this condition, (42) implies then that w∗
11,t >w ∗
01,t >w ∗
21,t.I f0 >γ 22 >γ 21, then w∗
22,t >
w∗
21,t. Once again, the ranking of the reservation wages implies that there is no interﬁrm mobility,
and the participation decision at period t is simply characterized by (55).
43Figure A.1: Value Function, Alternative 1
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44Appendix B–Drawing from the Posterior Distribution
Following the notation of Section (4.2), note that in matrix form we can write the model in (29),
(30), and (31) as
z∗
it =˜ xitβ + Ltαi + τit, (58)
for t =1 ,...,T,w h e r eαi ∼ N(f (xi1,...,x iT),Γi),a si sd e ﬁned in (34), τit ∼ N(0,Σ),a sd e ﬁned
in (37).




xyi1 00 0 0
0 xmi1 00 0
00 xwi1 00
⎞












00 0 xyit 0
00 0 0 xmit
00xwit 00
⎞








For clarity of presentation we deﬁne a few other quantities as follows. The parameter vector
β consists of the regression coeﬃcients in (29), (30), and (31), including the parameters from the
function JW
it deﬁned in (5), and the parameter vectors from the initial condition equations in (33).
The parameter vector γ consists of the coeﬃcients in (35). Note that the covariance matrix for αi,
Γi, is constructed from γ and ∆ρ as deﬁned in (34). Let the vector α contain all the individuals
speciﬁc random eﬀects, that is, α0 =( α0
1,...,α 0
N). For convenience we use the notation Pr(t | θ−t)
to denote the distribution of t, conditional on all the elements in θ, not including t.B e l o w w e
explain the sampling of each of the parts in θ (augmented by z∗), conditional on all the other parts
and the data.
Sampling the Latent Variables z∗:
There are three latent dependent variables: y∗
it, m∗
it,a n dw∗




it is observed if the ith individual worked in year t. Conditional on θ,t h e
distribution of the latent dependent variables is
z∗
it|θ ∼ N(˜ x∗
itβ + Ltαi,Σ).







it,θ), which are truncated univariate normals, with truncation
regions that depend on the values of yit and mit, respectively. Note that mit and wit are observed
only if yit =1 . Therefore, when yit =1we sample m∗
it from the appropriate truncated distribution.
In contrast, when yit =0 , the distribution of m∗
it is not truncated. Similarly, we can infer the




45Sampling the Regression Coeﬃcients β:
It can be easily shown (see Chib and Greenberg (1998) for details) that if the prior distribution
of β is given by β ∼ N(e β0, e B0), then the posterior distribution of β, conditional on all other
parameters is
β|θ−β ∼ N(ˆ β,B), where




































Dy1 =1and Dm1 =1i ft h ep e r s o ni si nh i s / h e rﬁrst year in the sample, and Dy1 =0and Dm1 =0 ,
otherwise.
Sampling the Individuals’ Random Eﬀects αi:
The conditional likelihood of the random eﬀects for individual i is






it − ˜ xitβ − Ltαi)0Σ−1(z∗
it − ˜ xitβ − Ltαi)
)
.
The prior distribution for the random eﬀects is N(0,Γi), so that the posterior distribution of
αi is
















t − ˜ xitβ).
Sampling the Covariance Matrix Σ:
Recall that the covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic error terms, τit, is given in (38). Since the
conditional distribution of Σ is not a standard, known distribution, it is impossible to sample from
it directly. Instead, we sample the elements of Σ using the Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm
(see Chib and Greenberg (1995)). The target distribution here is the conditional posterior of Σ,
that is,
p(Σ|θ−Σ) ∝ l(Σ|θ−Σ,α i,z∗
it)p(σ2
ξ)p(ρ).












where, Ait = z∗
it − ˜ xitβ − Ltαi.




ξ are chosen to be the conjugate distribu-
tions, truncated over the relevant regions. For ρ we have p(ρ)=N[−1,1](0,V ρ), a truncated normal
distribution between -1 and 1. For σ2
ξ we have p(σ2
ξ)=N(0,∞)(μσξ,V σξ), a left truncated normal
distribution truncated at 0. The candidate generating function is chosen to be of the autoregressive
form, q(x0,x ∗)=x∗ + vi,w h e r evi is a random normal disturbance. The tuning parameter for ρ
and σ2
ξ is the variance of vi’s.
Sampling Γi, ∆ρ and γ:
Recall that the covariance matrix Γi has the form given by






and ∆ρ is the correlation matrix given in (34). As in the sampling of Σ,w eh a v et ou s et h eM - H
algorithm. The sampling mechanism is similar to the sampling of Σ. The only diﬀerence is that
now we sample elements of γ and ∆ρ, conditional on each other, and the rest of the elements of θ.














and the prior distributions of γ and elements of ∆ρ are taken to be N(0,V γ) and N[−1,1](0,V δ),
respectively.
47Appendix C–Why do we Need the JW Function?
For illustration purposes, assume that one considers a simple wage regression in which there are
only returns to experience and returns to seniority. Note that new workers entering new jobs gain
one year of experience, but they also lose the returns to seniority that they have accumulated in the
previous job they have just left. Hence, two workers endowed with similar experience and leaving
ﬁrms after spells of similar lengths should also receive on average similar wages at the entry level in
their new ﬁrms. Moreover, if the returns to experience were linear, then two workers with distinct
levels of experience who are leaving their respective ﬁrms after spells of similar lengths, should also
see on average their wage change by similar amounts. That is, interﬁrm mobility that takes place
at diﬀerent points in one’s career (e.g., after one, two, or three jobs) should not matter much for
one’s wage change in his/her new ﬁrm. To see whether or not this is evident in the data, we present
in Table C.1 the average (log) wages of individuals who move right before, and immediately after,
the move, for all three educational groups. Each row of the table provide these statistics for a given
level of experience and seniority at the time of the move. The table clearly shows that wage changes
depend crucially on the level of experience and seniority of the worker at the time of a move.
For example, we compare the individuals with the same low level of seniority (less than two
years) in line 1, i.e., those with less than 5 years of experience with those in line 3, i.e., those with
5t o9y e a ro fe x p e r i e n c e ,a n dw i t ht h o s ei nl i n e6 ,i .e., those with at least 10 years of experience.
For the high school dropouts we see huge diﬀerences in the average growth rate of 2.2, 3.3, and
4.5, respectively. This seems to indicate that interﬁrm mobility beneﬁts low skilled workers later in
their career. This pattern seems quite similar for the college graduates but very diﬀerent for the
high school graduates. Note that there are generally large diﬀerences in the patterns of changes at
diﬀerent levels of seniority-experience combinations.
To check whether or not these raw statistics are indicative of some real phenomena, we regressed
the (log) wage at entry level of a job on experience at entry, seniority in the previous job, as well
as a set of dummy variable indicators for the number of previous jobs, for the three education
groups.35 The results clearly show that seniority in the previous job has a large, positive, and
signiﬁcant association with the wage in the new job for all education groups. Furthermore we ﬁnd
that for the high school graduates and college graduates experience also has positive and signiﬁcant
association with the new wage. For these two education groups the number of previous job changes
has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the entry level wage. In contrast, these factors seem to have
no eﬀect on the group of high school dropouts.
While these results are largely descriptive, they seem to strongly indicate that the entire career
path of an individual has to be taken into account. Moreover, they give rise to the particular
speciﬁcation of the JW function adopted in this paper. Namely, we allow for distinct jumps in
wages which are functions of the level of experience and seniority at the time of the jump.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































55Table 5: Estimated Cumulative and Marginal Returns to Experience
Cumulative Returns Marginal Returns (in %)
Group Years of Experience Years of Experience
5 1 01 52 0 51 0 1 5 2 0
P a n e lA :Q u a r t i cM o d e l
HS Dropouts .241 .362 .410 .420 3.442 1.550 0.482 -0.012
(.042) (.062) (.071) (.073) (.597) (.307) (.231) (.232)
HS Graduates .277 .402 .440 .438 3.776 1.447 0.232 -0.234
(.017) (.024) (.028) (.031) (.233) (.142) (.135) (.134)
College Graduates .430 .661 .762 .786 6.339 3.116 1.117 -0.045
(.029) (.044) (.052) (.058) (.421) (.264) (.244) (.244)
P a n e lB :Q u a d r a t i cM o d e l
HS Dropouts 0.101 0.246 0.472 0.678 2.661 1.959 1.256 0.554
(.005) (.012) (.022) (.028) (.286) (.248) (.215) (.191)
HS Graduates 0.146 0.253 0.320 0.349 2.526 1.744 0.961 0.179
(.008) (.015) (.022) (.027) (.154) (.135) (.122) (.116)
College Graduates 0.256 0.446 0.567 0.622 4.455 3.109 1.763 0.417
(.015) (.029) (.040) (.051) (.285) (.253) (.231) (.221)
P a n e lC :Q u a r t i cM o d e lw i t hn oJW Function
HS Dropouts 0.312 0.489 0.583 0.634 4.684 2.553 1.344 0.774
(.040) (.058) (.065) (.067) (.557) (.281) (.217) (.218)
HS Graduates 0.370 0.572 0.674 0.724 5.462 2.853 1.397 0.713
(.016) (.023) (.026) (.028) (.214) (.128) (.126) (.125)
College Graduates 0.588 0.939 1.129 1.214 9.105 5.198 2.600 0.911
(0.028) (.041) (.047) (.051) (.384) (.230) (.219) (.222)
Panel D: Quadratic Model with no JW Function
HS Dropouts 0.211 0.383 0.515 0.607 3.830 3.034 2.238 1.442
(.013) (.025) (.036) (.044) (.253) (.221) (.193) (.174)
HS Graduates 0.237 0.423 0.558 0.643 4.231 3.214 2.197 1.181
(.007) (.014) (.020) (.025) (.140) (.125) (.114) (.109)
College Graduates 0.401 0.710 0.928 1.053 7.105 5.263 3.420 1.578
(.013) (.024) (.035) (.044) (.244) (.220) (.203) (.197)
56Table 6: Estimated Cumulative and Marginal Returns to Seniority
Cumulative Returns Marginal Returns (in %)
Group Years of Seniority Years of Seniority
2 5 10 15 2 5 10 15
P a n e lA :Q u a r t i cM o d e l
HS Dropouts .133 .297 .507 .677 6.128 4.882 3.669 3.242
(.010) (.019) (.024) (.029) (.408) (.236) (.249) (.238)
HS Graduates .127 .283 .475 .616 5.850 4.590 3.215 2.555
(.006) (.011) (.014) (.018) (.227) (.141) (.150) (.150)
College Graduates .136 .294 .477 .615 6.109 4.513 3.035 2.630
(.010) (.019) (.026) (.034) (.412) (.257) (.279) (.272)
P a n e lB :Q u a d r a t i cM o d e l
HS Dropouts 0.151 0.266 0.347 0.392 4.966 4.721 4.314 3.906
(.015) (.029) (.040) (.050) (.253) (.216) (.169) (.156)
HS Graduates 0.094 0.228 0.435 0.619 4.612 4.347 3.906 3.464
(.003) (.008) (.013) (.018) (.153) (.132) (.108) (.105)
College Graduates 0.097 0.236 0.449 0.637 4.775 4.485 4.001 3.517
(.006) (.014) (.025) (.034) (.281) (.247) (.209) (.205)
P a n e lC :Q u a r t i cM o d e lw i t hn oJW Function
HS Dropouts 0.099 0.204 0.304 0.370 4.296 2.774 1.479 1.302
(.010) (.018) (.021) (.022) (.385) (.195) (.209) (.200)
HS Graduates 0.092 0.184 0.256 0.280 3.918 2.303 0.778 0.369
(.006) (.010) (.012) (.013) (.214) (.110) (.122) (.126)
College Graduates 0.097 0.177 0.212 0.216 3.838 1.675 0.095 0.308
(.010) (.017) (.020) (.021) (.381) (.179) (.196) (.195)
Panel D: Quadratic Model with no JW Function
HS Dropouts 0.054 0.131 0.251 0.359 2.653 2.510 2.273 2.035
(.005) (.011) (.018) (.022) (.216) (.177) (.125) (.114)
HS Graduates 0.042 0.102 0.192 0.268 2.070 1.915 1.656 1.397
(.003) (.006) (.010) (.013) (.121) (.099) (.074) (.076)
College Graduates 0.027 0.067 0.133 0.198 1.342 1.331 1.313 1.294
(.004) (.010) (.016) (.020) (.201) (.162) (.119) (.130)
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